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Abstract 
 
Is making political institutions more transparent an effective method for combating corruption? 
Common wisdom in the debate and research on the causes of corruption answers strongly in 
the affirmative. We argue that this optimistic view is both right and wrong. Transparency may 
be an important medicine against corruption, but only under certain conditions.  
In order to capture this conditionality the concept of transparency must be distinguished from 
the interrelated but qualitatively different concepts of publicity and accountability. Facing 
increased risks of having information about ones bad behaviour made publicly available 
(transparency) is not enough to affect elite actors’ behaviour, if the information is not likely to 
be broadly spread, processed and utilised as a ground for putting sanctions on these actors.   
The theoretical argument is tested in the paper by analyzing the interaction effects between the 
degree of freedom of the press (as indicia of transparency), free and fair elections (indicating 
the presence of an accountability mechanism) and the level of education (a condition for 
publicity) in a cross-country study of 107 countries. The results demonstrate that the failure of 
previous research to analyze interaction effects have led scholars to draw inadequate and 
misleading conclusions about the link between transparency, democracy and corruption. 
Furthermore, it is argued, these findings will help to solve a puzzle in the previous research on 
democracy and corruption. Taken one at a time transparency and free and fair elections will not 
help much to reduce corruption. Taken together, on the other hand, they can be a powerful 
team. 
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“Publicity is one of the purifying elements of politics. Nothing checks all the bad practices of 
politics like public exposure.”1 This firm belief of American president Woodrow Wilson led 
him to advocate his famous slogan of ‘open covenants openly arrived at’ in the international 
negotiations of the early 20th century. Wilson was convinced that open doors would air out any 
bad smell of factionalism and other forms of immoral behaviour occurring in the closed 
negotiation rooms.  
Jeremy Bentham was another strong advocate of putting the public light on political decision-
makers. It motivates public officials to do their duty, he argued: 
 
The greater the number of temptations to which the exercise of political power is 
exposed, the more necessary is it to give to those who possess it, the most powerful 
reasons for resisting them. But there is no reason more constant and more universal 
than the superintendence of the public.2  
 
Later, negotiation theorists and researchers in public administration have pointed to potential 
adverse effects of ‘too much’ transparency, in particular with respect to the efficiency of 
decision-making processes and the capacity to negotiate compromise solutions. “Although it is 
certainly important that the public have access to relevant information about administration, 
working in a goldfish bowl can rarely be as efficient as working in private”, according to Guy 
Peters.3  Fisher, Ury and Patton even claim that “a good case can be made for changing 
Woodrow Wilson’s slogan ‘open covenants openly arrived at’ to ‘open covenants privately 
arrived at’”, arguing that negotiators will produce wise agreements more easily in private than 
in public.4  
Still, great hopes are tied to the power of the public light to raise the quality and moral 
character of public policy.5 The increase in the usage of the term transparency in the last 
decade or so is dramatic. And most debaters seem to agree with Vishwanath and Kaufmann 
when they claim that “arguments against more transparency while merited in a few instances, 
are often not only limited in application, but fundamentally flawed”.6 
In the research and debate on the causes of and remedies for corruption the purifying power of 
transparency is a well established assumption. Montinola and Jackman, for instance, argue that 
“the freedom of information and association characteristic of democracies helps monitoring of 
public officials, thereby limiting their opportunities for corrupt behaviour”.7 Kaufmann 
considers transparency as an important development issue due to its powerful effect on 
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corruption. “Transparency promotes development indirectly, through better control of 
corruption and capture, which in turn we know are breaks to development and growth.”8 
A particularly attractive feature of transparency as a potential medicine against corruption is 
that it is a factor which seems to be feasible to implement by institutional reform. In one of the 
most comprehensive studies of the causes of corruption so far Treisman found that many of the 
important factors explaining corruption are long-term economic and socio-cultural variables, 
such as economic development, religion and colonial heritage. Free and fair elections also had 
a negative effect on corruption in Treisman’s study—but only after 40 years! Introducing free 
elections and party competition today would not help to bring down the level of corruption for 
a long time.9 From a central reformers’ perspective, thus, a factor which can be used in anti-
corruption reforms and have an effect in the present time would be especially welcomed.  
But does transparency really make a difference for corruption—what evidence do we have? 
Gerring and Thacker are not convinced that transparency does decrease the incidence of 
corruption. “It may have ambivalent or even negative effects”, they argue. “The existence of 
more information about putatively corrupt activities does not necessarily decrease information 
costs”.10 An overload of information and competing claims about corruption may make it more 
difficult for the public to know the good ones from the bad ones, according to this argument.  
In our view the fear of information overload seems to be somewhat overanxious. Furthermore, 
as we will demonstrate, three out of four comparative studies of corruption that have included 
some measure of transparency have indeed found significant negative effects. Probably the 
most important effort so far is that of Brunetti and Weder, who present very promising effects 
of press freedom in a cross-country study of 68 countries (in the main regressions). “A 
complete move to press freedom would lead to a dramatic reduction of corruption in the 
average country”, they argue.11 Their data suggests that “an improvement of one standard 
deviation in press freedom could reduce corruption between 0.4 and 0.9 points” on a scale from 
0 to 6. By way of illustration, the authors calculate what an increase in the freedom of the press 
would mean for a couple of countries. Thus, if Nigeria would attain the same level of press 
freedom as Norway, which has the highest score in the index, “it would mean a reduction in 
corruption to the level of Belgium”12!  
Our starting point in this article, however, is the conviction that the research so far has not been 
able to give the potential effect of transparency on corruption the rigorous test it deserves. One 
reason, as we will develop in more detail in the next section, is that the present research has not 
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considered the conditionality of the transparency effect, i.e. the possibility that transparency 
may be dependent on other factors in order to do the job.  
A second and connected reason is the unpersuasive treatment of democracy as a factor 
potentially affecting corruption. The present research has failed to acknowledge the fact that 
democracy has two core components—free and fair elections to institutions with supreme 
power and civil liberties such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, freedom of the press, 
right to access public documents and other instruments for obtaining transparency. The indices 
for democracy used in studies of corruption typically include only the electoral part. That 
means both that the effect of democracy on corruption may be underestimated and that it is 
impossible from these studies to distinguish between the effects of the different components of 
democracy, including transparency. As we will demonstrate considering the circumstances 
under which free and fair elections and transparency may affect corruption are crucial to 
understanding their significance. 
In this paper we first present a theoretical model arguing that transparency in itself is not 
enough to affect behaviour. It must be accompanied by a public willing and able to execute 
sanctions in order to make a difference for elite behaviour. The causal mechanisms behind 
effects of transparency on behaviour are assumed to be the anticipated probability of publicity 
and the subsequent increased risk for sanctions of bad behaviour that such publicity incurs on 
the actors if sufficient accountability mechanisms are in place.  
The model is subsequently tested in a cross-national comparison of more than a hundred 
countries. Subjective indexes of corruption are used as dependent variables. As a proxy for 
transparency we use two different data collections on freedom of the press. The more freedom 
of manoeuvre for journalists to report on corrupt acts, we assume, the larger the chances that 
information on corrupt activities on behalf of both private and public actors will be made 
available to the public.  
The results of the statistical analyses, which are robust to alternative measures of the key 
variables, suggest that a revision and specification of existing claims about the effects of 
transparency on corruption is needed. There is indeed a substantial negative effect in 
accordance with most existing claims, but the effect is dependent on external factors, in 
particular the degree of free and fair elections (accountability) and the level of education 
among the population (as a condition for publicity). These findings support the hypothesis that 
simply making information available is not enough to affect behaviour.  
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Thus, the optimistic conclusions of Brunetti and Weder with respect to the potential of 
transparency to reduce corruption are misleading. The effect of press freedom is indeed 
impressive in countries which have a relatively high level of electoral democracy and 
education, but minimal and statistically insignificant in less democratized countries with low 
levels of education. Introducing a Norwegian level of press freedom in Nigeria (which is close 
to the bottom in the corruption ranking on place 108) would not make them reach the 
corruption level of Belgium (on 26th place). Taking into account only the fact that Nigeria has a 
relatively low score on the free and fair elections variable (thus leaving out the additional effect 
of education, for which we do not have data for Nigeria) it will rather make it to the level of 
Albania (on 81th place). However, even this more modest improvement is burdened by so much 
statistical uncertainty, as we will demonstrate, that we cannot say with a reasonable degree of 
confidence that Nigeria would move at all in the ranking. 
One important conclusion with respect to development policy, thus, is that reforms focusing on 
increasing transparency must be accompanied with measures at strengthening the public’s 
capacity to sanction bad behaviour if we are to see any effects on corruption. Transparency is 
not the quick fix it may seem to be, but is dependent on other factors which may take a long 
time to improve. 
Another conclusion concerns the research on democracy and corruption. The interaction effect 
of freedom of the press and free and fair elections may be an important part of the solution to 
some puzzling findings in earlier studies. The reason why Treisman and others have found 
weak or lagged effects of democracy on corruption is probably that the correlation is non-
linear, as demonstrated by Montinola and Jackman.13 We suggest that the interaction effect 
between electoral democracy and civil liberties such as transparency may be one explanation to 
the threshold effect. Taken one at a time transparency and free and fair elections will not help 
much to reduce corruption. Taken together they are a powerful team. 
 
 
Why transparency is not enough 
The concept and phenomenon of transparency has for some time been subject to an 
increasingly broad and lively debate among social scientists, both in political science, law, 
economics, public administration, psychology and philosophy. This debate concerns normative 
issues of whether transparency is good thing (instrumentally and/or intrinsically) which should 
be promoted by institutional reforms (to which the answer usually is yes, but where there are 
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also some objections as noted before) and empirical questions on what the effect on 
transparency will be on different variables and under different circumstances (for example the 
effectiveness of juridical and political processes and economic markets, the quality of decisions 
taken, the democratic status of political processes, etc).14  
It is hardly surprising that the concept of transparency is used in many ways and with different 
meanings in this discussion. In our view this is not a big problem as long as the state of the 
field to a large extent still is about brainstorming, trying out different ideas and deriving 
hypotheses. We believe however that as scholars are moving towards empirical testing some 
conceptual convergence would be preferable. In particular, as we will argue in this article, 
transparency should be distinguished from two closely related concepts; publicity and 
accountability. Today these concepts are often used interchangeably, with the effect that 
important links between the three different phenomena are being missed. The following simple 
model explains how this is the case with respect to studies of corruption. 
We assume that a rational politician or civil servant will choose to take a bribe or commit some 
other corrupt act if the perceived benefit of this act is large enough to exceed the uneasiness 
created by the combination of the potential costs of accountability and the perceived risk of 
actually having to face these costs. Corruption will occur if  
 
BC > PrA*CA 
 
where 
 
- BC represents the perceived benefit of the corrupt act,  
- PrA refers to the probability that the actor will be held accountable for this act, 
and  
- CA indicates the costs incurred on the actor if he or she is eventually held 
accountable.  
 
Thus, corruption can be prevented by increasing the risk or the costs of accountability or by 
decreasing the benefits of corruption. Here we leave aside factors potentially affecting the 
perceived benefits of corruption (including both economic factors—such as the level of wages 
of public officials and the size of the public sector, which is sometimes argued to determine the 
‘supply of rents’—and norms affecting the perception of corruption) and the possible costs of 
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accountability (including for instance criminal law or loss of status and privileges connected to 
political power). Transparency enters the equation as a possible determinant of the probability 
of accountability. The point we want to make here, however, is that the link between 
transparency and accountability is not as straightforward as is often assumed.  
First of all accountability is primarily a function of publicity rather than transparency. 
Publicity, one can say, is a causal mechanism linking transparency and accountability. These 
concepts may be distinguished as follows. In our view the concept of transparency should be 
reserved to capturing the accessibility of information. Transparency literally means that it is 
possible to look into something, to see what is going on. A transparent organisation, political 
system, juridical process or market is one where it is easy for anyone, outside or inside, to 
acquire the information he or she needs to take decisions or to form opinions about issues 
which he or she is interested in. The information is there for those who are willing and able to 
seek it.  
Publicity on the other hand means that the information is actually spread to and taken in by a 
broader audience. Thus, while transparency implies that there is documentation available on 
the proceedings of a particular institution, publicity means that the content of this information 
has also become known among a broader public. Clearly transparency promotes publicity. In 
most cases information that is easily accessible would stand a greater chance of also being 
spread (although one can imagine that secret information that is leaked to the press may 
sometimes be more interesting to publish than information from official documents—just 
because it was secret). But there will be no publicity, i.e. no actual exposure of actions to a 
broad audience, no matter how transparent the process or the institution in question is, if the 
available information about these actions is left unattended. 
There may be several reasons why transparent information is not spread to a broader public. 
Information overload is one, as argued by Gerring and Thacker. Too much information on a 
certain issue may have the effect that important and publicly accessible facts are being 
drowned by other less important facts. Lack of mediators, such as a well functioning mass 
media is another. Furthermore, a lot of information which is accessible, such as public 
documents which are subject to freedom of information laws, will never be spread to a broader 
public simply because they concern issues which are immediately interesting only to a small 
group of especially interested actors.15  
Another reason why transparent information may not become publicly spread, one which we 
specifically addresses in this article, concerns the capacity of the public to access and process 
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the information. We hypothesise that especially the level of education is an important link 
between transparency and publicity. The higher the level of education the stronger the capacity 
of people to access and process information from the media and public records, and 
subsequently the higher the risk—from the policy-makers’ perspective—of publicity. The 
probability of publicity thus is a function of the level of transparency and the level of education 
among the public. Ceteris paribus, higher levels of transparency and education should increase 
the probability of publicity. 
However, and this is our second point in this context, while higher risks of publicity usually 
would imply higher risks of accountability, and therefore less corruption and other forms of 
‘bad behaviour’, this link is also not an automatic one. Again we need to look more closely at 
the concepts being used. Accountability is a concept which has flooded the political science 
and public administration literature for the last decade or so. We agree with Behn that it is 
usually hopelessly ill defined: “What do we really mean by this ubiquitous admonition to ’hold 
people accountable’? The phrase rolls off one individuals tongue and into another’s ear without 
registering in either’s mind. Indeed, using the phrase suggests that no real thinking is going 
on.”16 We have no reason here to debate the real meaning of the concept of accountability, but 
we do wish to separate it from transparency and publicity. In our view accountability involves 
something more than just having one’s actions publicly exposed. In case of misconduct 
accountability should imply that some kind of sanction is imposed on the actor. Being held 
accountable involves ‘paying the price’ for one’s actions. Sometimes the embarrassment and 
social stigma of having one’s bad behaviour exposed to the public may be a sufficient sanction. 
In other cases an actor may not care about what the public thinks. When it comes to corruption 
the sanction would usually be determined by the criminal law and the courts, and for 
politicians in democracies also by the voters at election day.  
Thus, while transparency promotes publicity, publicity promotes accountability by making the 
actions known and therefore possible to sanction. But publicity in itself is not enough to 
acquire accountability. It must be accompanied by some mechanism for sanctions. Increasing 
the risk of publicity will not induce any change in behaviour on the part of the policy-makers 
unless they believe that the public will go from awareness to action and actually impose the 
costs of accountability on them.17 And in order to take that step, unless the misconduct of the 
policy-makers is so great that a proper revolution is provoked, there must be some formal 
institutions in place for holding the policy-makers accountable. Thus we propose that the 
probability of accountability is a function of the probability of publicity and the existing formal 
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accountability institutions. In politics the most important accountability institutions, and the 
one which we will address specifically, is free and fair elections. A democratic regime will 
have to be more concerned with not being revealed as corrupt than an authoritarian regime 
since the former risks being kicked out in the next election.18  
As we will see later in this paper, the comparative studies made so far on the effect of 
democracy on corruption indicates that the link is more complicated than being just a matter of 
free and fair elections giving less corruption. In fact the correlation seems to be non-linear; 
highly mature democracies have the least corruption, while authoritarian regimes are less 
corrupt than semi-democracies or newly democratised countries. One reason for this somewhat 
mysterious relationship between democracy and corruption, we will argue, is that free and fair 
elections is not enough to increase the risk of accountability. As we have argued here a high 
risk of publicity is also necessary in order for the elections to be an effective instrument against 
corruption and other forms of misconduct. 
 
 
Previous research on transparency, democracy and corruption 
Why is corruption much more common in some countries than in others? In order to answer 
that question, which has important implications for development, growth and welfare19, we 
need to compare conditions in different countries. The last decade or so an increasing number 
of studies have been engaged in doing such comparative work.20 Important factors considered 
in these studies are economic variables such as trade and GDP, socio-cultural factors such as 
degree of integration with the international community, religion and colonial heritage, and 
institutional factors such as rule of law, democracy and type of electoral system. Probably the 
clearest and strongest correlation found in the literature is that between corruption and the level 
of economic development.21 Less developed countries tend to be more corrupt than more 
developed countries. The correlation is most likely reciprocal. While corruption is an 
impediment to growth, “policies that boost growth are likely in the long run to reduce 
corruption”.22 Our study presented here is intended to be a contribution to this research field, 
with a particular focus on transparency and democracy. The significance of transparency and 
democracy for corruption has in our view not been adequately dealt with. In this section we 
explain why we believe this is the case. 
Measuring democracy is a difficult thing. There are a number of cross-country data sets for 
comparative students to choose from, of which the quality varies both in terms of validity and 
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reliability.23 Most studies of corruption and democracy have used some version of Freedom 
House’s index of political rights (which before 1989 was referred to as Gastil’s index of 
political rights, as it was developed by Raymond Gastil), which means that the concept of 
democracy in these studies refers to free and competitive elections.24 The political rights index 
is constructed from a number of questions which have to do with the citizens’ rights to elect 
freely, and under competitive circumstances, their political representatives. These elected 
representatives must also be in possession of real political power in order to score high as 
democracies. 
One obvious problem with this way of measuring democracy is that it captures only half of 
what we usually mean by democracy. Civil liberties such as freedom of speech, organisation, 
religion and freedom of the press are core parts of the theoretical concept of democracy as we 
use it daily and as developed by democratic theorists such as Dahl and others.25 A country is 
fully democratic only when the rulers are elected and when civil liberties apply.  
Empirically these two components of democracy are correlated. Countries that score high on 
one index will often do well also on the other, as can be seen in table 1, which lists levels of 
electoral democracy and press freedom for 111 countries. But the correlation is far from 
perfect. It can not be taken for granted that countries which have free elections are careful to 
acknowledge civil liberties. 
The failure of the research on corruption so far to acknowledge civil liberties and distinguish it 
from the electoral component of democracy may have led scholars to draw inadequate 
conclusions. Given the common claim that transparency is detrimental to corruption—how do 
we know that the findings with respect to competitive elections are not in reality to a large 
extent produced by the partly accompanying transparency and other civil liberties? As long as 
civil liberties are not separated and controlled for conclusions with respect to the importance 
for corruption of elections may be subject to omitted variable bias. 
Vice versa, the same problem applies to those studies which actually have studied the effect of 
some component of civil liberties, typically freedom of the press, on corruption, but have failed 
to control for electoral democracy in an adequate way. To date we know of four studies which 
in different ways have tested the effect of freedom of the press on corruption. As we will see 
one of those failed to find a significant effect, while the other three did find significant negative 
effects of freedom of press on corruption. In our view, however, these studies suffer from (in 
some cases among other things) insufficient controls for free and fair elections. 
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Clearly, the most ambitious and rigorous effort so far to capture the significance of a free press 
for combating corruption is that of Brunetti and Weder, which was mentioned in the 
introduction.26 They test two different indices of press freedom and four different measures of 
corruption.27 The results demonstrate a sizeable negative effect of press freedom on three of the 
four corruption indexes. “All in all the results indicate that press freedom might be an 
important check on corruption”.28  
Our concern with Brunetti and Weder’s study relates to the control variables. Their main 
political institutional control variables are “the quality of the bureaucracy” and “rule of law”, 
indexes taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). One problem is that both 
seem to be close to the dependent variable (the rule of law variable includes for instance 
“sound political institutions”). But most importantly there is no control for electoral 
democracy. ICRG’s rule of law variable is a very broad measure of political institutional 
reliability and legitimacy, but it is not a measure of democracy.29 In fact rule of law seems to 
be partially capturing economic development, as GDP per capita—which usually is strongly 
correlated with democracy—is insignificant in Brunetti and Weders regressions. 
Chowdhury, on the other hand, has indeed separated and controlled for electoral democracy 
and press freedom.30 His results indicate a significant negative effect of press freedom on 
corruption, under control for electoral democracy and GDP per capita.31 Unfortunately, 
Chowdhury’s analysis suffers from two other problems, which in our view calls for a cautious 
interpretation of the results. First, as a measurement of press freedom he uses Freedom House’s 
index for press freedom from 2002. This index, however, includes corruption as one of its 
component parts (under the heading “economic pressure and control of the media”). Secondly, 
he uses Vanhanen’s measure of electoral democracy, which suffers from sever validity 
problems. Vanhanen measures democracy by looking at two criteria: 1) The share of the 
population which turn out to vote in elections, and 2) the share of parliamentary seats going to 
the largest party. The second criterion is supposed to measure party competition, but it does, as 
Hadenius and Teorell note, “in large parts miss the mark”.32 Rather than party competition it 
captures party fractionalisation. Even worse, however, is the first criterion. A high turnout in 
the elections is not a democratic value in itself. Elections may be manipulated and elected 
assemblies may be powerless. In some countries voting is compulsory. Thus, “the most 
democratic country over the last 30 years, according to this index, was Italy in 1992—on 
account of the pronounced party divisions and mandatory voting in that country”.33 
Furthermore, the fact that Vanhanen uses the share of the population, rather than eligible 
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voters, has the odd effect that countries with a younger population (a high degree of infants 
below the voting age) score lower on the democracy index. 
Besley and Prat in their study focus primarily on the significance of media ownership 
structures—to what extent the media is state owned, privately owned or have foreign owners 
and the degree of ownership concentration.34 Freedom of the press and corruption are treated as 
dependent variables to ownership structure.35 Their main findings indicate that state ownership 
and concentrated ownership are associated with higher levels of corruption and lower levels of 
press freedom, while high degrees of foreign ownership works in the opposite direction. 
However, one regression also treats freedom of the press as an independent variable affecting 
corruption. The result is a significant negative effect, thus supporting Brunetti and Weders 
findings. The problem with Besley and Prat’s study is, again, the way they control for free and 
fair elections. The only indicator defining electoral democracy is “whether a country has held a 
legislative election in the previous five years”.36 But whether a country has held elections at all 
is a poor indicator of free and fair elections.  
Lederman, Loayza and Reis Soares do include both democracy and freedom of press in their 
study.37 When GDP was introduced into their regressions, however, the significant effect of 
press freedom disappeared. They concluded that ”freedom of press seems to be partially 
capturing the effect of economic development on corruption”.38 Unfortunately, Lederman, 
Loayza and Reis Soares fail to specify the content of their indicia for democracy any further 
than stating that it is a “dummy for a regime with democratic characteristics, not run by a 
military officer”. The data for the dummy variable is from Beck et. al. 2001. This is not very 
helpful however since Beck et. al. in their database on political institutions has a long list of 
indicators, and its unclear how Lederman, Loayza and Reis Soares have compiled their dummy 
variable. For sure it does not include any subjective assessments of whether elections are in 
practise free of manipulation, as this is not included in Beck et. al.’s data set.39  
Our objections towards these studies are certainly not intended to imply that they are without 
value with respect to the issue of transparency and corruption. The fact that three out of four 
studies indicate a significant negative effect is strong indicia that transparency, as measured by 
freedom of the press, can reduce corruption. But we do insist that the issue of transparency and 
corruption has not yet been given the rigorous test it deserves.  
Furthermore, as we argued earlier, transparency alone is unlikely to affect corruption. The 
causal link goes via increased probabilities of publicity and accountability. These factors in 
turn depend not only on transparency, we have hypothesised, but also on the level of education 
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(which increases the capacity of people to access and process available information) and the 
formal accountability institutions in place (most notably elections). At least partial empirical 
support for this causal chain is given by Adserà, Boix and Payne in their analysis of the effects 
of newspaper circulation on corruption. Their data—both time series and cross-national data—
indicates a weak effect of electoral democracy on corruption, but a much larger effect of the 
interaction between newspaper circulation and free elections. In our terminology newspaper 
circulation would be a proxy for publicity, while electoral democracy represents accountability 
institutions. Adserà, Boix and Payne demonstrate that both are needed to produce an effect on 
corruption. Since they do not introduce civil liberties or press freedom in their analysis, 
however, they are not really testing the effect of transparency.40  
Thus, in what follows we will include analyses of the interaction effects of transparency and 
education and electoral democracy, which earlier studies have failed to analyse. As Treisman 
has noted, one of the reasons why corruption is difficult to study is that “its many likely 
determinants interrelate in complicated ways”.41 Still, the comparative research so far has not 
taken interaction effects into account (Adserà, Boix and Payne being an exception). As we will 
demonstrate, in this case it proves to be crucial for understanding the relationship between 
transparency and corruption. 
 
 
The data 
It is often said that corruption is hard to study empirically, not least because criminal activities 
are difficult to observe directly. In order to capture the dependent variable comparative 
scholars have relied on indexes of perceived corruption constructed from surveys with 
inhabitants, domestic and foreign business people and country experts. The surveys include 
questions about perceptions of the degree of corruption in the state apparatus and the likeliness 
that the respondents would be asked for bribes in different situations. Some of these indexes 
are used in this study as well. Our main data set is the World Bank Governance Indicators 
Dataset. We also use the data bases of Transparency International and the International 
Country Risk Guide to corroborate our results. All three indexes have been frequently utilized 
in previous research.  
One problem with these indexes is that it is difficult to say exactly what they are measuring. 
The usual definition of corruption in the literature is something a long the line of “the improper 
use of public office in exchange for private gain”.42 Obviously a very broad variety of actions 
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will fit this definition. Corruption thus comes in many forms. The literature speaks of 
bureaucratic and political corruption, grand and petty corruption, collusive and extortive 
corruption, black, white and grey corruption, etc.43 However, these distinctions are blurred as 
they are mashed together in the indexes.  
Another problem with subjective indexes is that perceptions are often biased. However, as 
Treisman has argued, if these indexes merely indicate a shared bias, rather than a common 
perception of reality, as one could argue, it is a surprisingly widely shared bias as the different 
indexes are usually highly correlated.44 Thus, if we are unsure about precisely what these 
indexes are measuring, at least they are measuring the same ting… And while the value of 
subjective measures can be discussed, and is being discussed, it is clear that the research field 
would be very poor without them.  
The primary independent variable in this study is transparency. And while there are other 
possibilities—such as looking at the existence of formal freedom of information laws or the 
degree of simplicity of regulations facing firms and the public (which is close to the public 
choice notion of ‘big government’ creating a ‘supply of rents’)45, or using failure to report 
economic data to the UN or the World Bank as a measure of government opaqueness46—we 
believe that in studies of corruption the level of press freedom is a particularly suitable indicia. 
While formal access to documents and information may also be problematic for corrupt actors, 
making their activities more difficult to conceal, very few instances of corruption will turn up 
in public archives. Fact-digging journalists, however, are a real potential threat to those who 
wish to keep their back-door manoeuvres secret. 
A free media is therefore a measure of transparency which is relevant to studies of corruption. 
Following our definitions of transparency and publicity the media will usually promote both. In 
its digging function it creates transparency, by making previously secret information available 
to the public. In its publishing function it creates publicity to this information, by spreading it 
to people. The indexes of freedom of the press will probably capture more of the former than of 
the later, as it directly concerns the ability of individual journalists to reveal instances of 
corruption. We will thus consider freedom of the press as primarily a proxy for transparency.  
Our main index for freedom of the press is Freedom House’s. Their press freedom index of the 
year 2000 does not include corruption as one of its components, as later versions do, which 
makes it possible to use. The index includes indicators of laws and regulations that influence 
media content, political pressures and controls on media content, economic influences over 
media content and repressive actions (killing journalists, physical violence, censorship, self-
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censorship, arrests, etc). The sources of the raw data, according to Freedom House, are 
“correspondents overseas, staff travel abroad, international visitors, findings of human rights 
and press organizations, a regular flow of foreign publications, a 24-hour news service, 
specialists in geographic and geopolitical areas, and reports of governments themselves”.47 We 
also test an alternative index of press freedom produced by Reporters Without Borders.48  
To measure electoral democracy we use Polity’s index. Polity’s and Freedom Houses’ indexes 
are the two that come out best in Hadenius and Teorell’s evaluation of different democracy 
indices (although they are not precisely over-enthusiastic over these two indices either).49 
According to Hadenius and Teorell Freedom House scores reasonably well in terms of 
theoretical validity (when including civil liberties), but less well with respect to methodological 
reliability. In particular it is difficult to follow how the coding is carried out. Polity, on the 
other hand, has its strength on the methodological side, but is weaker in terms of validity, 
according to Hadenius and Teorell (mainly because civil liberties are excluded).50 From our 
point of view most importantly is to note that Polity includes free and fair elections, while 
excluding civil liberties, thus making it a suitable measure of electoral democracy. We use 
Polity because the correlation between this index and the press freedom indexes are somewhat 
lower than for Freedom House’s political rights index, which decreases the risk for 
multicollinearity.51   
Education is also introduced in the analysis both as a control variable and as an interaction 
variable. We thus want to test both if some of the correlation between freedom of the press and 
corruption can be accounted for by the level of education and if higher levels of education—as 
we hypothesise in the theoretical model—increase the effect of freedom of the press. We use 
data from the World Bank on the expected number of years of formal schooling that children 
are expected to receive, including university education and years spent in repetition. This can 
be seen, according to the World Bank, as “an indicator of an education system’s overall level 
of development”. 52 (For robustness we also test two other measures of education.)  
The two most important control variables besides democracy—following the current research 
on the causes of corruption—are economic development and rule of law. Economic 
development is measured by GDP per capita. Rule of law is obviously trickier to capture. We 
use data from UNDP which includes indicators of both ‘law’ (“the strength and impartiality of 
the legal system” and ‘order’ (“popular observance of the law”).53  
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Table 1, on the next page, shows the individual scores on corruption, freedom of the press and 
electoral democracy for the 111 countries included in the data set, ranked by the level of 
corruption. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
 Analysis and results 
First we test the unconditional average effect of press freedom on corruption, to see if we can 
replicate the findings of previous studies—indicating a sizeable effect—also while controlling 
for electoral democracy. The base regression includes press freedom and electoral democracy, 
along with the two most basic additional control variables—economic development (as 
measured by GDP per capita) and rule of law. The results of the OLS regression for the base 
model are shown in the first column (model 1) of table 2. Press freedom has indeed a 
significant negative effect on corruption, controlling for electoral democracy, economic 
development and rule of law. The effect is also relatively large—almost the size of rule of law. 
Both the effects of rule of law and of GDP per capita have the expected negative signs and are 
statistically significant. There is no significant effect of electoral democracy when freedom of 
the press is included in the model.54  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The second model adds two control variables, years of democratic rule and education, which 
may be correlated both to press freedom and to corruption. As discussed earlier one finding in 
the previous research is that while the current level of democracy (usually measured as 
electoral democracy) may show weak or insignificant effects on corruption the number of years 
of democratic rule could be of importance. We have also argued that the level of education 
should be of importance for the link between transparency and corruption. Here education is 
introduced as an external control variable.  
The results of model 2 are given in the second column of table 2. The press freedom effect 
remains negative and sizeable. In fact it even increases, so that it is now larger than rule of law. 
Just like the current level of electoral democracy, there is no significant effect of having had a 
longer experience of democratic rule.55 Education, as measured by the average expected years 
of schooling has no significant effect at all. However, although not shown in table 2, when we 
substitute expected years of schooling for the alternative measure of education—primary 
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completion rates (the percentage of students completing the last year of primary school)—there 
is a significant positive effect of education. A higher degree of lower-level education would 
thus be associated with higher levels of corruption. At the moment we have no reasonable 
explanation for this counter intuitive result. It adds to the equally ambiguous findings of 
previous research with respect to education and corruption.56 
In model 3 we have added two additional control variables, which have proven to be important 
in earlier studies of corruption. Openness for international trade, which increases competition 
and exposes domestic actors to norms of the international community, is measured by the sum 
of exports and imports as a share of GDP. We have also included a dummy variable for British 
colonial heritage (1 for countries which are former British colonies, 0 for others), which have 
shown important effects in some earlier studies.57 As can be seen in the third column of table 2 
freedom of press is still significant at a reasonable degree of uncertainty. Openness to 
international trade shows no significant effect, while the effect of being a former British colony 
is highly significant and remarkably large.58 
 
Alternative indicators of the main variables 
In order to test the robustness of the findings of the multivariate regressions we have 
experimented with some alternative indices of the key variables, corruption and press freedom. 
The first two columns of table 3 demonstrate the results of the base model, using the press 
freedom index of Freedom House, for the corruption indexes of Transparency International and 
ICRG. The subsequent three columns substitute the Freedom House index for the press 
freedom index of Reporters Without Borders. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
As table 3 demonstrates the press freedom effect is somewhat smaller in absolute terms and is 
more uncertain in some of the alternative models. But the effect is still negative in all models 
and significant at the 5-percent level in four out of six specifications (including the original 
model). In the models using the ICRG corruption index, for some reason, the degree of 
explained variation is much lower than in the first models using the World Bank and the 
Transparency International indexes. 
The multivariate analyses so far seem to confirm the main results of the studies cited earlier, 
indicating a strong negative effect of freedom of the press on corruption under control for other 
important determinants of corruption. Furthermore, we can now conclude that this effect is not 
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produced by the correlation between press freedom and electoral democracy, which the 
previous studies had failed to investigate adequately.  
However, this is not the final word on the link between transparency and corruption. Figure 1 
illustrates the bivariate correlation between freedom of press and corruption.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Looking carefully at the picture it actually seems to show a clear negative effect of press 
freedom on corruption only at press freedom levels of ca 7 and higher, on the scale from 0 to 
10. Thus, speaking of an “average effect” may be misleading, as the effect seems to be much 
stronger in countries which already have a relatively high degree of press freedom. Running 
the same base model as before, but excluding countries with a high level of press freedom 
(higher than 6) demonstrates that this is the case (table 4). 
 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Increasing press freedom marginally in countries which have a low level to begin with does not 
significantly affect corruption. One interpretation here may be that a moderately free press is 
not enough. In order to be a check on corruption press freedom must reach a certain level. 
Another possibility, following the theoretical model earlier, is that interaction effects are 
involved. Next, we demonstrate that this is indeed the case. 
 
Interaction effects 
We posited before that corruption will occur if the perceived benefits of the corrupt act 
supersede the discomfort of worrying about the costs of accountability. Transparency may 
enhance this discomfort by increasing the risk of publicity, which in turn may increase the 
probability of accountability. But transparency itself is not enough to produce this effect, we 
argued. In order to increase the probability of publicity, i.e. the chances that the information 
made available by transparency institutions (for instance by an actively digging press) is 
widely spread among the public, the public must be capable of accessing and processing the 
information. The level of education, we assume, is an important link between transparency and 
publicity. Thus, we expect that increasing the level of education will enlarge the effect of press 
freedom on corruption.  
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But a high probability of publicity is also not enough to affect corruption. In order for 
increasing risks of publicity to enhance the uneasiness of corrupt policy-makers there must be 
some mechanisms of accountability—including costly sanctions—in place, which may be 
activated by such a public exposure. The effect of transparency therefore should be larger in 
countries which have a higher degree of electoral democracy, i.e. in countries where public 
exposure of corruption may imply getting kicked out of office.  
In the statistical analysis the interaction variables are created by the products of the indexes for 
freedom of the press and electoral democracy (FoP*Electoral dem.) and education 
(FoP*Education) respectively. They are introduced into the base regression, including also 
freedom of the press, electoral democracy, economic development and rule of law. Table 5 
presents the results. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Model 1 in the first column of table 5 shows the base regression with the interaction variable 
for press freedom and electoral democracy included. As hypothesised there is a significant 
negative interaction effect. Increasing the level of electoral democracy with one unit, on the 
scale from 0 to 10, adds -0.08 to the press freedom effect. It is also seen that press freedom has 
no significant effect in authoritarian regimes (when the level of electoral democracy is zero, 
which is how the value of FoP in model 1 (0.15) should be interpreted). Even more striking 
perhaps is the strong and significant positive effect of electoral democracy, in countries with no 
press freedom (which is how the value of electoral democracy (0.39) should be interpreted). In 
fact, although not shown here, the effect of electoral democracy only switches to negative at 
levels of press freedom higher than 5 (on the scale from 0 to 10). We will return to this finding 
later on. 
But looking at the regression coefficients only goes some way to understanding the relationship 
between press freedom, electoral democracy and corruption. We can see that for purely 
authoritarian systems—i.e. when there are no formal accountability mechanisms in place—
increasing press freedom does not reduce corruption. But what about countries which have at 
least some degree of free and fair elections? Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of press freedom 
for different levels of electoral democracy. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
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The negative interaction effect of freedom of press and electoral democracy is illustrated by the 
slope of the line, representing the marginal effect of press freedom on corruption at different 
levels of electoral democracy. The more free and fair elections the larger the (negative) press 
freedom effect (which for the lowest levels of electoral democracy is even positive). The dotted 
lines in figure 2 illustrate the confidence interval (95%), i.e. the degree of uncertainty of the 
estimated marginal effect of press freedom. The key to reading the figure is to see whether the 
zero-line is encompassed within this interval or not. If it is, we cannot say with certainty that 
there is a marginal effect of press freedom on corruption at all. As can be seen in figure 2 only 
at electoral democracy levels higher than 6 can we be reasonably certain that there is a negative 
effect. The precise magnitude of the effect, however, is subject to a relatively large uncertainty. 
We conclude from model 1 in accordance with our hypothesis that taken one at a time freedom 
of the press and electoral democracy will not help to stop corruption (especially not electoral 
democracy, which may even be contrary). But taken together they can be a powerful team. 
However, we also posited that publicity is a necessary link between transparency and 
accountability. Higher levels of education should increase the probability of publicity, thus we 
expected a negative interaction effect with press freedom, indicating that higher levels of 
education will amplify the negative effect of press freedom on corruption. Model 2 in table 5 
shows that this is also what we have in the data. Increasing the level of education with one unit 
on the scale from 0 to 10 will at the same time increase the negative effect of press freedom on 
corruption with 0.15 units. The results of model 2 also demonstrates that there is no significant 
press freedom effect at all in countries for which education levels approach zero. Our 
hypothesis about education being an important condition for the transparency effect has been 
verified. Figure 3 describes the conditional effect in more detail. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
The interpretation of figure 3 is the same as with figure 2 before. Higher levels of education 
clearly boost the press freedom effect. A definite press freedom effect is not found until a 
country reaches an educational level of ca 4, but it increases sharply thereafter. 
However, one conclusion that can not be drawn here is that higher levels of education are an 
effective medicine against corruption. The effect of education on corruption is more 
complicated than that, as noticed before. In fact, when we calculate the net effect on corruption 
from model 2 in figure 3 of raising the level of education we find that it will actually be an 
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increase in corruption—despite the fact that it also strengthens the negative effect of press 
freedom. Thus, education seems to be a double-edged sword. It increases the capacity of 
people of holding elite actors accountable, but still, for some other reason (which we do not 
know), corruption increases with higher levels of education.59 As before we have also run 
robustness tests for all alternative indices of the key variables.60 
Finally, model 3 in the third column of table 5 investigates the press freedom effect on 
corruption, considering the interaction effects with electoral democracy and education at the 
same time. The interaction with electoral democracy is still negative in this model, but weaker 
and no longer statistically significant, while the interaction with education is about the same as 
in model 2.61 That does not necessarily mean, however, that the level of democracy does not 
affect the marginal effect of press freedom on corruption. It only means, in line with our 
hypothesis, that the interaction effect of press freedom and free and fair elections depends on 
the level of education. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate, plotting as before the marginal effect of press 
freedom for different levels of democracy, but this time with the level of education specified at 
a low and a high level respectively. 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
Figure 4 shows the marginal effect of press freedom on corruption at a very low level of 
education (education = 1). The effect is positive for electoral democracy levels lower than 8. 
However, the zero-line is clearly within the confidence interval for every level of electoral 
democracy. Consequently, we cannot be confident that there is any effect of press freedom at 
all in countries with very low levels of education regardless of the level of electoral democracy. 
(In practise there are few countries which have such a low level of education, which is a 
contributing factor to the high degree of uncertainty.) 
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
Figure 5, on the other hand, indicates that for countries with a very high level of education (10) 
the press freedom effect will be negative even in authoritarian systems. A higher level of 
electoral democracy still increases the press freedom effect, but free and fair elections are not 
necessary for having at least some negative marginal effect of press freedom on corruption. 
Although not shown here plotting the marginal effect of press freedom in this way for the 
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intermediate levels of education indicate, for example, that at a medium level of education 
(education = 5) the press freedom effect starts to become statistically significant in countries 
with a medium level of electoral democracy (electoral democracy =5).  
The findings in model 3 are in line with our hypotheses. Not even the highest levels of 
transparency and accountability will affect corruption if there is only a slim chance of 
publicity. And while formal accountability mechanisms do increase the effect of transparency, 
publicity seems to be the most important condition of the two.  
 
 
Press freedom and the puzzling relationship between democracy and corruption 
So far we have considered electoral democracy as a control variable and an interaction variable 
in order to better understand the significance of transparency for corruption. But if we also look 
at the interaction effect of press freedom and electoral democracy from the perspective of 
democracy, we may have an additional important finding here. Scholars so far have had much 
difficulties straightening out the implications of democracy for corruption. Press freedom may 
be one answer to this puzzle. 62 
The comparative research so far has produced contradictory and ambiguous results with respect 
to the link between democracy and corruption. On the one hand, the major conclusion from 
Lederman, Loayza and Reis Soares’ study is that the current political institutions of a country 
are “extremely important” in determining the incidence of corruption.63 They find their results 
encouraging to political reformers who want to do something about corruption. Especially 
being currently a democracy gives a significant and large negative effect on corruption in their 
data.64  
Ades and Di Tella, on the other hand, failed to find any evidence of democracy leading to less 
corruption. Their data rather seemed to indicate the opposite. Although with some uncertainty 
(significant only at the 0.10 level) their results with respect to democracy suggested that 
countries with low levels of electoral democracy have lower corruption.65 That democracy 
sometimes “may actually increment the opportunities and magnitude of corruption” is also 
supported by qualitative studies.66 
Conversely, Sandholz and Koetzle found correlations with lower levels of corruption of both 
the current level of democracy and the number of years of democratic rule, but it was weaker 
and more uncertain (significant at the 0.10 level) than all the other variables they investigated 
(GDP/capita, state intervention in the economy, trade, colonial heritage and religion).67 
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Similarly, Gerring and Thacker, while leaving out authoritarian regimes and only looking at 
current democracies, found a weak but significant negative correlation between corruption and 
the number of years of democratic rule. One of Treisman’s major findings, which he thought 
was a bit discouraging from the perspective of an anti-corruption reformer, was that corruption 
to a large extent seemed to be a function of a country’s institutional and cultural historical 
legacy rather than its current policies (with policies for growth as the exception). With respect 
to democracy he concluded that there appears to be “a threshold effect. … The fact that a 
country is democratic today makes just about no difference to how corrupt it is perceived to be. 
What matters is whether or not it has been democratic for decades”. In Treisman’s data there 
was no significant effect of a country being currently a democracy. For the three different data 
sets that he used to measure corruption (the Transparency International corruption perception 
indexes of 1996, 1997 and 1998) the threshold indicating a significant effect of democracy on 
corruption appeared after 20 years in one and only after 40 years in the other two.68   
One reason for the ambiguous results with respect to democracy and corruption may be that the 
relationship is non-linear, which makes it difficult to detect in the linear regressions that 
scholars usually employ. Montinola and Jackman have demonstrated precisely such a non-
linear correlation. Their study indicated that authoritarian regimes were less corrupt than 
partially democratized countries, while fully democratized countries were the least corrupt. 
Using a measure of the level of democracy as scaled from zero (least democratic) to ten (most 
democratic) they found a negative correlation starting at around seven on the scale.69  
 
“Perhaps our most important conclusion is that political competition [i.e. electoral 
democracy] matters, and there is an interesting threshold in this relationship. 
Corruption is typically a little higher in countries with intermediate levels of 
political competition  than in their less democratic counterparts, but once past the 
threshold, higher levels of competition are associated with considerably less 
corruption.”70  
 
The non-linear relationship between democracy and corruption has subsequently been 
confirmed by Sung, who found that a cubic function produced the best fit. Democracy and 
corruption were negatively correlated at the two ends of the scale, but positive for semi-
democracies. Sung found a similar threshold effect at the upper side of the democracy scale as 
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that indicated by Montinola and Jackman (around 2,7 on the scale from 1 (most democratic) to 
7 (least democratic). 
Thus, the correlation between democracy and corruption involves threshold effects. This is the 
case both with respect to the current level of democracy (as demonstrated by Montinola and 
Jackman and Sung) and to the degree of ‘maturation’, i.e. the number of years of democratic 
rule (as shown by Treisman). However, so far scholars have not explained the content of the 
threshold effect. What is it that makes democracy shift from being a source of corruption to 
start becoming a remedy? 
We believe that at least one part of the explanation may be found in the second, but frequently 
omitted, component of the concept of democracy—civil liberties. As discussed earlier, 
previous comparative research has equated democracy with free and fair elections. The 
previous findings in this paper indicates that free and fair elections without civil liberties (as 
represented by freedom of the press) is positively correlated to corruption, but that the effect 
switches to negative at high levels of press freedom (with not too low levels of education as an 
additional condition). 
In order to further examine the argument that press freedom may help countries get beyond the 
threshold we test a curvilinear model on our data, introducing freedom of press as a control 
variable in a second step.  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
 
Model 1 in table 6 tests the assumption that there is a non-linear relationship between 
democracy and corruption in our data (with GDP as a basic control). The curvilinear term 
(Electoral dem^2) indicates the extent to which the effect of electoral democracy on corruption 
is dependent upon the level of electoral democracy. The fact that it is highly significant in 
model 1 is in line with the conclusions of previous research that the relationship is indeed non-
linear. More important here, however, is the change that occurs when freedom of the press is 
introduced in the second model. The curvilinear term falls by one third and the uncertainty 
increases (in fact it is only barely significant at the 0.10 level). Press freedom thus almost 
erases the curvilinearity of the model.  
Although this may not be the whole story of the threshold effect and the puzzling findings in 
previous research with respect to democracy and corruption it is probably an important part of 
it. Thus, one reason why partially and newly democratized countries often have a higher degree 
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of corruption than mature and fully democratized countries, we propose, is that there is a lack 
of media scrutiny on the political system in these countries. Even in cases where there are 
accountability institutions in place, in the form of general elections, the risk that corrupt 
activities will be exposed to the public is not high enough in these countries to prevent such 
activities.  
 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has delivered three important conclusions with respect to the relationship between 
transparency and corruption. First, it demonstrates that the negative correlation which previous 
studies have indicated holds also when controlling for electoral democracy. Before, we could 
not say for sure that earlier findings were not produced by omitted variable bias, now we are 
confident that they are not. It really seems as if having nosey journalists around can make 
political actors more nervous about corrupting themselves.  
However, the second major conclusion is that looking only at the average effects gives a 
misleading picture of the significance of transparency for corruption. Transparency in itself is 
not enough. Just making information available will not prevent corruption. The causal link 
involves two additional steps. In order to get to the corrupt activities increasing transparency 
must affect the probability of publicity, which in turn should raise the risks for policy-makers 
of being held accountable. The interaction effects of freedom of the press with education and 
electoral democracy demonstrates the first and the second link respectively. Thus, paraphrasing 
the title of Brunetti and Weder’s article, these findings indicate that a free press may be bad 
news for corruption.71 But they also indicate that transparency is no quick fix for anti-
corruption reformers. In countries with low levels of education and in semi-democratic 
political systems transparency must be accompanied with additional reforms strengthening the 
capacity of people to process the information and execute sanctions if it is to have any effect.  
Thirdly, we believe that we have an explanation for the puzzling findings of previous research 
with respect to democracy and corruption. There seems to be a threshold effect of democracy 
on corruption, but what determines the threshold? What does it take to make democracy start 
hitting in on corruption? We argue that it is the interacting effect of having free and fair 
elections and a free press (or civil liberties more broadly) which gives the necessary kick. 
Corruption researchers must acknowledge that democracy is not just a question of elections. 
Only when we have in place a lively public sphere of educated people, where the risk for media 
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scrutiny and bad publicity is always present, free and fair elections will start to reduce 
corruption. 
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Appendix  
 
Data definitions and sources 
 
FoP-FH Press freedom in 2000 (Freedom House) (free: 0-30; partly free: 31-60; not free: 
61-100) 
FoP-RSF Press freedom in 2003 (Reporters Without Borders) (0= highest level of press 
freedom, 100= lowest level of press freedom) 
Corr-TI Aggregate corruption indicator for 2003 (Transparency International) (0= 
highest level of corruption, 10= lowest level of corruption) 
Corr-WB World Bank Governance Indicators Dataset for 2002 (World Bank) (-2.5 = 
lowest, 2.5 = highest) 
Corr-ICRG Average corruption 2001-2003 (International Country Risk Guide) (0=lowest, 
6=highest) 
Rule of Law Legal impartiality and popular observance of the law, 2003 (UNDP) (0=lowest, 
6=highest) 
GDP/Capita GDP index 2003 (UNDP). The index is calculated on the basis of GDP/capita 
(PPP US$) 
Education  
(WB1) Expected year of schooling 2003 (World Bank)  
Education  
(WB2) Primary completion rate 2003 (World Bank) (Percentage of students completing 
the last year of primary school total number of students in the last grade of 
primary school, minus the number of repeaters in that grade, divided by the total 
number of children of official graduation age.  
Education  
(UNDP)  Education 2003 (UNDP) Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross 
enrolment ratio and the adult literacy rate.  
Electoral dem. Level of democracy (Marchall and Jaggers, Polity IV, 2003) (0=lowest, 
10=highest) 
Years of dem. Democratic consolidation, 1999 (Freedom House) 
TRADE Export+ Import/GDP 2003 (UNCTAD) 
Former British Whether or not the country is a former British colony, 2000 (Treisman) (1= 
Former colony British colony, 0= Not a British former colony).  
 
Note: All indexes (except from former British colony) are transformed to a scale from 0 to 10. 
0 = lowest and 10 = highest.  
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Table 1. Scores on corruption, freedom of press and electoral democracy 
 
Country Corruption 
 
FoP 
 
Electoral 
dem. 
 Country Corruption FoP Electoral 
dem. 
 Country Corruption FoP Electoral 
dem. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
 
39. 
Finland      
Sweden       
Iceland      
Singapore 
Denmark      
New Zealand  
Netherlands  
Canada       
Switzerland 
United Kingdom       
Norway 
Australia    
Austria  
United States       
Spain 
Chile        
Germany   
Namibia      
Cyprus    
Portugal     
Japan        
Ireland 
France       
Israel       
Slovenia    
Belgium   
Botswana     
Costa Rica   
Tunisia   
Estonia    
Greece   
 Uruguay      
Hungary    
Italy    
Kuwait       
Qatar        
Trinidad Tobago  
Morocco 
Oman 
Polen 
   
0 
.12 
.27 
.35 
.47 
.47 
.47 
.59 
1 
1.15 
1.45 
1.47 
2.03 
2.36 
2.36 
2.51 
2.57 
2.95 
2.98 
3.07 
3.10 
3.21 
3.24 
3.33 
3.42 
3.54 
4.01 
4.07 
4.10 
4.48 
4.48 
4.54 
4.72 
4.78 
4.90 
4.95 
5.19 
5.34 
5.34 
5.37 
9.03 
9.32 
9.27 
3.40 
9.50 
9.05 
9.56 
9.09 
9.56 
8.56 
9.79 
9.43 
9.21 
8.73 
9.19 
7.97 
9.13 
7.46 
8.92 
8.77 
8.71 
8.49 
8.31 
7.71 
8.02 
9.50 
7.88 
8.91 
3.94 
8.59 
7.72 
7.77 
7.79 
8.08 
6.18 
5.11 
7.88 
6.04 
4.18 
8.62 
10 
10 
na 
2 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
9 
10 
6 
10 
10 
10 
10 
9 
10 
10 
10 
9 
10 
1 
7 
10 
10 
10 
10 
0 
0 
10 
0 
0 
10 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
 
48. 
 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
 
 
71. 
72. 
73. 
 
South Korea  
South Africa 
Czech Rep.   
Slovakia 
Lithuania   
Malaysia     
Gambia       
Malawi       
Mocambique   
Jordan      
Bahrain      
Croatia   
Sri Lanka    
Brazil  
Latvia   
Peru            
Belarus      
Jamaica      
Cuba         
Egypt        
Dominican Rep. 
Mexico       
Ghana        
China        
El Salvador  
Saudi Arabia 
Argentina    
Colombia     
Senegal      
India 
Ethiopia 
Mali         
Panama       
Sierra Leone 
 
5.54 
5.60 
5.72 
5.96 
6.05 
6.25 
6.25 
6.34 
6.34 
6.37 
6.52 
6.58 
6.64 
6.69 
6.72 
6.75 
6.81 
6.81 
6.99 
7.11 
7.23 
7.46 
7.46 
7.52 
7.61 
7.67 
7.70 
7.79 
7.79 
7.79 
7.81 
7.84 
7.96 
7.96 
8.02 
8.15 
8.57 
7.65 
8.59 
4.25 
4.47 
5.81 
6.22 
5.37 
3.89 
4.90 
4.43 
7.51 
8.29 
4.57 
3.52 
9.35 
2.35 
4.49 
7.78 
5.12 
6.13 
3.46 
6.88 
2.67 
6.85 
5.30 
7.42 
6.86 
5.04 
7.91 
7.65 
3.06 
8 
9 
10 
na 
10 
0 
4 
7 
6 
2 
0 
7 
7 
8 
8 
9 
0 
9 
0 
0 
8 
7 
8 
0 
7 
0 
8 
7 
8 
9 
na 
6 
9 
5 
75. 
76. 
77. 
 
79. 
 
81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
 
86. 
 
88. 
89. 
90. 
91. 
92. 
93. 
94. 
 
 
97. 
98. 
99. 
 
101. 
102. 
103. 
104. 
 
106. 
 
108. 
109. 
110. 
111. 
Thailand     
Turkey      
Philippines  
Congo 
Bulgaria     
Romania     
Venezuela    
Albania     
Algeria      
Lebanon      
Honduras     
Iran         
Bangladesh   
Guatemala    
Yemen        
Bolivia      
Vietnam      
Pakistan     
Armenia      
Syria 
Kasakhstan   
Moldova  
Haiti        
Zambia       
Ukraine      
Libya     
Uganda       
Madagascar   
Paraguay 
Ecuador      
Russia      
Indonesia    
Azerbaijan   
Nigeria      
Zimbabwe     
Kenya        
Angola     
7.99 
8.05 
8.08 
8.08 
8.14 
8.14 
8.38 
8.40 
8.46 
8.49 
8.49 
8.52 
8.52 
8.67 
8.70 
8.76 
8.88 
8.96 
8.99 
9.08 
9.08 
9.08 
9.11 
9.20 
9.29 
9.29 
9.35 
9.38 
9.50 
9.53 
9.61 
9.61 
9.73 
9.73 
9.82 
9.91 
10 
 
7.69 
5.32 
2.67 
7.72 
7.71 
6.61 
7.37 
5.57 
.71 
6.28 
5.10 
5.22 
4.53 
5.76 
4.46 
8.39 
3.86 
4.95 
5.49 
4.52 
5.28 
4.02 
5.40 
5.05 
2.67 
5.22 
6.81 
7.59 
4.90 
6.52 
6.08 
5.31 
4.43 
5.81 
4.60 
4.37 
3.46 
9 
8 
0 
8 
9 
8 
7 
7 
1 
7 
na 
6 
4 
8 
1 
8 
0 
0 
5 
0 
8 
0 
1 
3 
0 
7 
0 
7 
7 
6 
8 
7 
0 
4 
0 
8 
1 
Sources: Corruption: World Bank (2002), Freedom of the Press: Freedom House (2000), Electoral democracy: Polity (2003). Note: The ranking list (1-109) follows the corruption index, which 
has been standardised so as to range from 0 (lowest level of corruption) to 10 (highest), as have the press freedom index (0 = lowest press freedom, 10 = highest) and the index for electoral 
democracy (0 = lowest level of electoral democracy, 10 = highest). 
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Table 2. Freedom of the press and corruption. Results of multivariate tests. 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Corruption 
(World Bank index) 
Independent 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 13.293*** 
(24.559) 
14.330*** 
(23.279) 
14.876*** 
(23.023) 
FoP -.33** 
(-2.538) 
-.43*** 
(-2.751) 
-.40** 
(-2.566) 
 
Electoral dem. -.04 
(-583) 
.04 
(.436) 
.01 
(.114) 
GDP/capita -.44*** 
(-5.232) 
-.52*** 
(-3.669) 
-.59*** 
(-4.246) 
Rule of Law -.35*** 
(-5.016) 
-.32*** 
(-4.334) 
-.31*** 
(-4.316) 
 
Years of dem.  -.09 
(-1.156) 
-.06 
(-.789) 
Education  .01 
(.044) 
0 
(.022) 
 
Trade   0 
(.036) 
Former British 
colony 
  -.98*** 
(-2.735) 
 
   
N 107 81 80 
Adjusted R .72 .77 .79 
Note: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, t Statistics in parentheses.  
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Table 3. Testing the base regression with alternative indices of corruption 
and press freedom. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Three different corruption indexes 
Indep. variables TI ICRG WB TI ICRG 
Constant 11.241*** 
(26.656) 
8,837*** 
(15.203) 
13.702*** 
(17.588) 
11.155*** 
(18.292) 
9.925*** 
(12.205) 
FoP (FH) -.21** 
(-2.070) 
-.14 
(-1.008) 
   
FoP (RWB)   -.27** 
(-1.993) 
-.10 
(-950) 
-.31** 
(-2.135) 
Electoral dem. 0 
(-.030) 
-.06 
(-.753) 
-.07 
(-.1.001) 
-.05 
(-.893) 
.01 
(.930) 
GDP/capita -.45*** 
(-6.861) 
-.23** 
(-2.546) 
-.46*** 
(-5.389) 
-.46*** 
(-6.937) 
-.24*** 
(-2.676) 
Rule of Law -.26*** 
(-4.786) 
-.13* 
(-1.778) 
-.39*** 
(-5.580) 
-.29*** 
(-5.315) 
-.14* 
(-1.898) 
 
     
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 
Adjusted R² .74 .34 .71 .73 .36 
Note: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 t Statistics in parentheses.  
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Figure 1. Freedom of press and corruption. Bivariate correlation. 
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Table 4. Freedom of the press and corruption in countries with low levels of 
press freedom. 
 
 
Independent variables 
 
Dependent variable: Corruption (World Bank index) 
Constant 9.802*** 
(7.771) 
FoP .149 
(.564) 
Electoral dem. -.044 
(-.499) 
GDP/capita -.236* 
(-1.873) 
Rule of Law -.278** 
(-2.550) 
 
 
N 45 
Adjusted R .29 
Note: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, t Statistics in parentheses.  
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Table 5. Freedom of the press and corruption. Interaction effects with 
electoral democracy and education.  
 
 Dependent variable: 
World Bank corruption index 
Independent  
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 10.510*** 
(9.755) 
9.578*** 
(6.134) 
8.262*** 
(4.406) 
FoP .15 
(.713) 
.29 
(1.097) 
.51 
(1.605) 
Electoral dem. .39** 
(2.429) 
0 
(.045) 
.23 
(1.182) 
GDP/Capita -.33*** 
(-3.677) 
-.59*** 
(-4.401) 
-.51*** 
(-3.462) 
Rule of Law -.34*** 
(-4.981) 
-.25*** 
(-3.406) 
-.25*** 
(-3.377) 
FoP*Electoral dem. -.08*** 
(-2.953) 
 (-.05) 
(-1.256) 
Education  1.01*** 
(3.054) 
.93*** 
(2.770) 
FoP*Education  -.15*** 
(-3.345) 
-.14*** 
(-2.939) 
 
   
Observations 107 81 81 
Adjusted R² .75 .80 .80 
Note: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, t Statistics in parentheses.  
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Figure 2. Marginal effect of press freedom at different levels of electoral 
democracy. 
 
 
Note: Dotted line indicates the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 3. Marginal effect of press freedom for different levels of education. 
 
 
Note: Dotted line indicates the 95% confidence interval 
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Figure 4. Marginal effect of press freedom for different levels of electoral 
democracy at a very low level of education. 
 
 
Note: Dotted line indicates the 95% confidence interval 
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Figure 5. Marginal effect of press freedom for different levels of electoral 
democracy at a very high level of education. 
 
Note: Dotted line indicates the 95% confidence interval 
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Table 6. Investigating the non-linear relationship between democracy and 
corruption. 
 
 Dependent variable: World Bank corruption index 
Independent  
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 10.600*** 
(17.282) 
12.293*** 
(14.949) 
FoP  -.43*** 
(-2.961) 
Electoral dem. .41* 
(1.946) 
.39* 
(1.912) 
Electoral dem^2 -.06*** 
(-2.646) 
-.04* 
(-1.669) 
GDP/Capita -.63*** 
(-6.869) 
-.61*** 
(-6.873) 
 
  
Observations 107 107 
Adjusted R² .64 .66 
Note: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, t Statistics in parentheses.  
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1
 Woodrow Wilson, quoted from Goodin 1992, p. 126. 
2
 Bentham 1816 [1999] p. 29. 
3
 Peters 1995, p. 297. 
4
 Fisher, Ury & Patton 1999, p. 36f.  
5
 For an analysis of the debate between negotiation theorists and deliberative democratic 
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6
 Vishwanath & Kaufmann, 1999, p. 5. 
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Gerring & Thacker 2004, p. 316, Lederman, Loayza and Reis Soares 2001, p. 8. 
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 Kaufmann 2005.  
9
 Treisman 2000, 433ff. 
10
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11
 Brunetti & Weder 2003, p. 1813. 
12
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13
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14
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15
 The later fact is an important limitation for the common claim, especially by economists, that 
transparency is an effective medicine against the power of special interests. 
16
 Behn 2001 p.  
17
 Thus we are uncomfortable with statements such as the following by Lederman, Loayza and 
Reis Soares, indicating an automatic link: “By increasing transparency freedom of the press 
reduces the informational problem in the political system and increases accountability” 
(Lederman, Loayza & Reis Soares 2001, p. 17). Similarly, Montinola and Jackman claim that 
“transparency itself should further dampen the incentives for corruption” (Montinola & 
Jackman 2002, p. 154).  
18
 At least this is the case as long as the authoritarian regime does not go so far as to provoke a 
revolution (in which case the costs of accountability may be very high, as for example the 
Romanian dictator Ceausescu found out as he was shot against a wall). 
19
 Cf. Mauro 1995, Bardhan 1997. 
20
 See, for example, Mauro 1995, Ades & Di Tella 1999, Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000, Treisman 
2000, Lederman, Loayza & Reis Soares 2001, Montinola & Jackman 2002, Brunetti & Weder 
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2003, Persson, Tabellini & Trebbi 2003, Sandholz & Gray 2003, Gerring & Thacker 2004, 
Walker 2004, Gerring & Thacker 2005,  
21
 See for example, Mauro 1995, Bardhan 1997, Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000, Treisman 2000, 
Montinola & Jackman 2002, Gerring & Thacker 2004. 
22
 Treisman 2000, p. 440. 
23
 A review of five such indices of democracy—Freedom House, Polity, Vanhanen, Alvarez et. 
al. and Reich—can be found in Hadenius & Teorell.  
24
 Of the studies cited here Montinola & Jackman, Ades & Di Tella, Sandholtz & Koetzle and 
Treisman all use Freedom House or Gastil. (Montinola & Jackman follow Bollen and add 
subjective measures by Banks on “freedom of group opposition” and  “effectiveness of the 
legislative body” as well as figures on election turnout.) Gerring & Thacker mainly use Polity 
and partly Freedom House for constructing their measure of democratic consolidation. 
Treisman uses the index of Alvarez et.el. for democratic consolidation, while Sandholtz & 
Koetzle uses Banks for democratic consolidation. Lederman, Loayza and Reis Soares employ a 
dichotomous democracy variable from Beck et.el., whose content they fail to specify. The 
exception is Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000 who include not only Freedom House’s political rights 
index but also their index of civil liberties, including freedom of the press (which they, 
however, do not control for separately from the political rights). The problem with using the 
civil liberties index, and the reason why others have chosen not to (for instance Treisman, p. 
434, note 39), is that one of its composite parts is in fact the level of corruption, i.e. the 
dependent variable. 
25
 Dahl 1989. 
26
 Brunetti & Weder 2003. 
27
 The press freedom indexes are taken from Freedom House and Humana, corruption indexes 
from ICRG, the World Bank (1997), the Institute for Management Development and 
Transparency International. 
28
 Brunetti & Weder 2003, p. 1821. 
29
 Apart from “sound political institutions” ‘rule of law’ includes “a strong court system and 
provisions for an orderly succession of power” as well as the degree to which “citizens of a 
country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and 
adjudicate disputes” (Brunetti & Weder 2003, p. 1808). In one regression Brunetti and Weder 
excludes authoritarian regimes from the sample, in order to test for endogeneity problems (i.e. 
the chance that corruption influences freedom of the press rather than vice versa). Here they use 
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Gastil’s political rights index to define the cut off (countries scoring higher than 5 on Gastil’s 
scale form 1 to 7 are defined as authoritarian). The effect of press freedom is the same, with the 
same control variables (quality of bureaucracy and rule of law), as when authoritarian regimes 
are included (p. 1816).  
30
 Chowdhury 2004. 
31
 Chowdhury 2004, p. 96. 
32
 Hadenius & Teorell, p. 15. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Besley & Prat 2001. 
35
 Besley and Prat use Freedom House’s press freedom index of 1999 and three corruption 
indexes (TI 1999, ICRG (year unclear) and the World Bank 2000). Besley & Prat 2001. 
36
 Besley & Prat 2001, p. 8. The data is from Beck et. al. (probably 2000, although not clearly 
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37
 Lederman, Loayza & Reis Soares 2001. 
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 Lederman, Loayza & Reis Soares 2001, p. 32. 
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 Beck et. al. 2001. 
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 Adserà, Boix & Payne 2003. For measuring democracy they use Jaggers and Gurr’s Polity III 
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circulation is taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators (2000), indices of 
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47
 Freedom House, Press Freedom Survey 2000. (http://www.freedomhouse.org/pfs2000/) 
48
 The correlation between the two indexes is 0,90. The index of Reporters Without Borders 
includes “every kind of violation directly affecting journalists (such as murders, imprisonment, 
physical attacks and threats) and news media (censorship, confiscation of issues, searches and 
harassment). It registers the degree of impunity enjoyed by those responsible for these press 
freedom violations. It takes account of the legal and judicial situation affecting the news media 
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(such as the penalties for press offences, the existence of a state monopoly in certain areas and 
the existence of a regulatory body) and the behaviour of the authorities towards the state-owned 
news media and international press. It also takes account of the main obstacles to the free flow 
of information on the Internet. Reporters Without Borders has taken account not only of abuses 
attributable to the state, but also those by armed militia, clandestine organisations or pressure 
groups that can pose a real threat to press freedom.” RSF 2003, Second world press freedom 
ranking, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=8248. 
49
 Hadenius & Teorell, p. 20. 
50
 Ibid, p. 11ff. 
51
 The bivariate correlations between Freedom House’s press freedom index and the two 
indexes for electoral democracy are 0,81  for Polity and 0,87 for Freedom House’s political 
rights index. The question of how much multicollinearity is too much has been given many 
different answers in the literature. When we have tested for multicollinearity in the forthcoming 
additive models Polity’s electoral democracy variable is safe with respect to tree of four 
different rules of thumb that are indicated in econometrics textbooks (a VIF-factor lower than 
10, the square root of the VIF-factor lower than 2, individual R^2-values lower than overall 
R^2. See, for example, Greene 1997). We are slightly above Lewis-Beck’s rule of thumb of a 
correlation between the independent variables higher than 0.8 (Lewis-Beck, 1980). In the 
interaction models, however, the VIF-factor increases above 10 for many coefficients. The 
main problem with multicollinearity, if it exists, is that the results tend to underestimate the 
strength and significance of the correlated factors.   
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www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2005/wditext/Section2.htm 
53
 UNDP, in turn, get their data from ICRG. This is not the same variable as Brunetti & 
Weder’s rule of law variable, however. See ICRG, The Political Risk Rating, 
www.icrgonline.com. 
54
 Electoral democracy does have a significant negative effect of -.20 under control for GDP per 
capita and rule of law, which disappears when freedom of the press is introduced in the model. 
55
 The democratic years variable has been computed from data from Freedom House. It covers 
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56
 Brunetti and Weder, for example, found no significant effect on corruption of two alternative 
indices for education (“avarage educational attainment” and “secondary school enrolment”) 
(Brunetti & Weder 2003, p. 1809). Ades and Di Tella, on the other hand, did found a negative 
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effect of education on corruption (although significant only at the 10 percent level) (Ades & Di 
Tella 1999, p. 987).  
57
 In particular Treisman emphasises the importance of a British colonial history, which he 
attributes to the inheritance of a specific British “legal tradition” (Treisman 2000, p. 418ff.). 
58
 This is so also when we exclude the United States, which is defined as a former British 
colony in this data set. 
59
 The same result is found when we use the alternative measure of education, primary 
completion rates. Since the result puzzles us we have also tested a third indicator of educational 
level from UNDP— combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio and the 
adult literacy rate—which again gives the same result. 
60
 All six specifications including the interaction effect of press freedom and electoral 
democracy (three corruption and two press freedom indices) demonstrate a significant negative 
interaction effect. Two of the specifications are significant at the 1 % level, three on the 5 % 
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freedom of press and education (using the two freedom of press indexes and the three 
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Reporters Without Borders’ index are significant on the 5 and the 10 (and the third on the 15) 
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 It is a bit difficult to compare model 1 and model 3, however, since the sample is different 
due to the fact that we only have comparable data on education for 81 countries. Notably, when 
we use the alternative measure of education (primary completion rates, rather than expected 
years of schooling) the interaction effect of freedom of press and electoral democracy is 
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since we have two interaction terms in the model (see, for instance Brambor, Clark & Golder 
forthcoming and Cortina 1993). This could mean that the interaction effect of freedom of press 
and electoral democracy is somewhat underestimated in model 3. 
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 On this point we disagree with Gerring and Thacker who claims that there is a “general 
finding” that “more democracy – specifically, a longer experience with competitive, multi-party 
elections – fosters lower levels of corruption” (Gerring & Thacker 2004, p. 298). They base this 
conclusion on the studies of Sandholz & Koetzle 2000, Treisman 2000 and Montinola & 
Jackman 2002. As we describe below we do not believe that this is a reasonable conclusion to 
draw from these studies. 
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